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DIOS MIO—The KISS Principle of the 
Ethical Approach to Copyright and Right 
of Publicity Law 
Michael D. Murray* 
ABSTRACT 
To copy or not to copy, to exploit the famous celebrity image 
or not to exploit it; these are the questions. The message of the 
modern legal world communicated through multiple voices in 
the academy is that copying often is perfectly acceptable and 
even laudable. An artist or designer might conclude that it is 
both legal and ethical to use whatever you can, use whatever you 
can get away with, and use it until you get sued for using it. Yet 
plagiarism in the arts and sciences is nearly universally 
condemned. 
This Article proposes an ethical approach to the use of 
copyrighted works and names, images, and likenesses protected 
by the right of publicity. This approach is based on the ethical 
requirements of the law as synthesized from the cases presenting 
concrete narratives concerning fair and appropriate uses of 
protected works, names, and images. My thesis may be summed 
up in a revised form of the KISS principle (Keep it simple, 
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stupid!) known as DIOS MIO: 
 
DIOS MIO 
Don’t Include Other’s Stuff 
or 
Modify It Obviously 
 
Although simplified to this acronym, the ethical 
considerations concerning copyright-protected works and right 
of publicity-protected names and images are far from simple. 
The advice of this Article reflects the convergence of 
predominant purpose analysis and transformative/ 
transformation analysis in copyright and right of publicity law 
that has led to a single set of recommendations for the legal and 
ethical treatment of protected works and celebrity names, 
images, and likenesses: seek first to create and not to copy or 
exploit, and create new expression by obvious modification of the 
old expression and content. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO DIOS MIO 
Should ethical designers or artists seek to steal and exploit 
as much copyrighted material and valuable celebrity names, 
images, and likenesses as they can get away with? Should an 
ethical approach to copyright and right of publicity law start 
with an examination of how best to exploit the legal defenses or 
gaps in coverage in the law or with a calculated analysis of how 
unlikely it would be to be sued? Do the voices of the legal 
academy who speak about the benefits of copying also 
encourage plagiarism in artistic creation?1 My answer to all of 
these questions is “no.” 
Copyright is the intellectual property protection of original 
and creative works including designs, images, writings, and 
artistic creations. Right of publicity is a right to control the use 
of a person’s name, image, or likeness under legal theories that 
draw from intellectual property law, equity, privacy law, and 
property law. I have synthesized the law of copyright, right of 
publicity, and plagiarism, and both the legal rules and the 
narratives of case law applying the legal rules to actual, 
concrete situations that have arisen under the law to define a 
legal and ethical approach to the copying of others’ works and 
aspects of their persona. This explanatory synthesis defines a 
                                                          
 1. See Reuven Ashtar, Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the 
Immaterial: A Proposal for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 261, 318 (2009); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of 
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement 
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1444–45 (1989) [hereinafter Merits of 
Copyright]; Ashley M. Pavel, Reforming the Reproduction Right: The Case for 
Personal Use Copies, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1615, 1642 (2009); John 
Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an 
Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1254–55; Rebecca 
Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545–46 (2004) [hereinafter 
Copy This]. 
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legal course that avoids stealing and exploiting the works or 
the good names and valuable images of other artists and 
celebrities. The proper, ethical concern of designers and artists 
should be whether it is appropriate in a legal and ethical sense 
to replicate works or images and likenesses at all, and if so, 
how the use should treat the underlying borrowed works, 
images, or likenesses. 
An ethical approach to the use of copyrighted works and 
names, images, and likenesses protected by the right of 
publicity may be summed up in a revised form of the KISS 
principle (Keep it simple, stupid!) known as DIOS MIO: 
DIOS MIO 
Don’t Include Other’s Stuff 
or 
Modify It Obviously 
Although simplified to this acronym, the ethical 
considerations concerning copyright-protected works and right 
of publicity-protected names and images are far from simple. 
Fortunately, the same requirements of copyright law that call 
for the creation of original, copyrightable works also provide 
the incentive not to plagiarize because plagiarism most often 
produces unoriginal and, therefore, uncopyrightable works. In a 
similar way, an alteration of a copyrighted work or a valuable 
celebrity name, image, or likeness that creates new, original 
expression that predominates over the expression in the 
original not only fulfills originality requirements and avoids 
plagiarism but also would constitute a fair use of the original 
copyrighted work or celebrity name, image, or likeness. DIOS 
MIO reflects the current convergence of predominant purpose 
analysis and transformative/transformation analysis in 
copyright and right of publicity law that has led to a single set 
of recommendations for the legal and ethical treatment of 
protected works, names, and images. 
II. DON’T INCLUDE OTHER’S STUFF—THE ETHICS OF 
CREATION 
A. BRIDGING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PLAGIARISM AND 
COPYING FOR SELF-EXPRESSION OR SELF-ACTUALIZATION 
The concept of plagiarism ties the act of copying with the 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
2013] DIOS MIO 93 
 
motivation of exploitation,2 and thus it focuses attention on the 
ethics of using other people’s valuable works or their names, 
images, or likenesses. The legal world hates plagiarism,3 but 
often seems to admire or even encourage certain types of 
copying.4 Plagiarism is held to be unethical,5 even morally 
reprehensible,6 an offense carrying the badge of moral 
turpitude7 that can suspend an attorney’s license8 or deliver a 
                                                          
 2. Plagiarism is an act of theft, a misappropriation of the ideas of others 
combined with explicit or implied misattribution to oneself to gain some 
advantage. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (9th ed. 2009); see also 
K.R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 51–62 (1988). 
 3. See Carol M. Bast & Linda B. Samuels, Plagiarism and Legal 
Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual 
Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 777, 780–81 (2008) (describing the views of the 
Legal Writing Institute and Judge Richard A. Posner); Lisa G. Lerman, 
Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and 
Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (2001) (listing penalties for 
plagiarism in law school); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Tangled Web of Plagiarism 
Litigation: Sorting Out the Legal Issues, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 245, 246–47 
(noting problems for faculty plagiarism); Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong: 
Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REV. 513, 529 (1992) 
(“A plagiarist, by falsely claiming authorship of someone else’s material, 
directly assaults the author’s interest in receiving credit.”); see also Stuart P. 
Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on 
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 218–19 (2002) (analyzing the legal comparison between 
plagiarism and theft). 
 4. See, e.g., Merits of Copyright, supra note 1, at 1382–83; Pamela 
Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1192–93, 1228–29 
(2010); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 609, 645–49 (2006); Copy This, supra note 1, at 568–74. 
 5. JOSEPH GIBALDI, MLA STYLE MANUAL AND GUIDE TO SCHOLARLY 
PUBLISHING 151 (2d ed. 1998) (“Plagiarism is a moral and ethical offense 
rather than a legal one.”); Bast & Samuels, supra note 3, at 790; Kim D. 
Chanbonpin, Legal Writing, The Remix: Plagiarism and Hip Hop Ethics, 63 
MERCER L. REV. 597, 601 (2012); see also Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical 
Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 264 (2008) 
(explaining that extensively citing legal sources is acceptable, but that there is 
a fine line between citation and plagiarism). 
 6. Velez v. Alvarado, 145 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160–61 (D.P.R. 2001) 
(reprimanding lawyer for verbatim copying of a judge’s opinion and order); 
Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism: Legal and Ethical Implications for the 
University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1, 19, 29–50 (2010); Cooper J. Strickland, Recent 
Development, The Dark Side of Unattributed Copying and the Ethical 
Implications of Plagiarism in the Legal Profession, 90 N.C. L. REV. 920, 932–
33 (2012). 
 7. Darby Dickerson, Facilitated Plagiarism: The Saga of Term-Paper 
Mills and the Failure of Legislation and Litigation to Control Them, 52 VILL. 
L. REV. 21, 58 (2007); Latourette, supra note 6, at 19. 
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death sentence to a student’s or academic’s working life.9 
Nevertheless, copying is sometimes described as a form of 
expression that facilitates communication in fulfillment of First 
Amendment values,10 and to that extent, copying might be 
defended as a vehicle of self-expression and self-actualization,11 
and an activity that furthers artistic growth and advances the 
arts.12 
                                                          
 8. See In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 550–53 (Ill. 1982) (upholding the 
suspension of an attorney’s license for plagiarizing parts of an L.L.M. thesis); 
Iowa Sup. Ct. Atty. Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Iowa 
2010) (noting that the plagiarism amounted to a material misrepresentation); 
Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 297–98 
(Iowa 2002) (censuring a lawyer for claiming fees for work that was largely 
plagiarized). Cf. In re Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871, 871–72 (Minn. 1988) (finding 
that a student who plagiarized a paper during law school should be admitted 
to the bar). 
 9. ST. ONGE, supra note 2, at 39; Deborah R. Gerhardt, Plagiarism in 
Cyberspace: Learning the Rules of Recycling Content with a View Towards 
Nurturing Academic Trust in an Electronic World, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 
(2006); Latourette, supra note 6, at 7 (“[S]ome academics regard plagiarism as 
a capital offense potentially meriting the academic death knell for students 
and for faculty.”); Kevin J. Worthen, Discipline: An Academic Dean’s 
Perspective on Dealing with Plagiarism, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 441, 442–44 
(2004); see also RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT: CHEATING AND 
PLAGIARISM 2–3 (1994) (noting that the punishments necessarily differ based 
on the position of the plagiarist). 
 10. See supra note 1. 
 11. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 
1535–37 (1993); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (discussing the importance of freedom of expression); 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 54–60 (1960); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–91 (1978); Alan 
Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1110–11 (1991); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s 
Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 415–17 (2003); Martin H. Redish, 
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982). Several 
justices have spoken eloquently on the importance of free speech. See, e.g., 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 12. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, 
and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 488 (2007) (“[P]roblems arise from the 
reality of borrowing and other techniques that involve some degree of copying 
as important elements in the creation of new works.”); David A. Simon, 
Culture, Creativity, & Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 322–25 
(2011); see also  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART & COMMERCE THRIVE 
IN A HYBRID ECONOMY 17–19 (2009); KEMBREW MCLEOD ET AL., CREATIVE 
LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 11–16 (2011); Julie E. 
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In order to bridge the obvious disconnect between the 
abhorrence of plagiarism and the toleration or tacit 
encouragement of certain forms of copying, the study of law and 
ethics must recognize that plagiarism has been associated with 
the theft of ideas and the words and images that embody and 
express those ideas for the purpose of gaining an advantage—
personal or professional credit, recognition, an academic grade, 
or remuneration—as a result of that theft.13 Thus, plagiarism is 
a form of exploitation, but one that is primarily concerned with 
the theft and misattribution of ideas and insights to the credit 
of the plagiarist.14 Plagiarism is a form of kidnapping and 
enforced servitude of abducted ideas15—the activity of an 
intellectual press-gang that shanghais a crew of ideas and 
                                                          
Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151, 1179–80 (2007) [hereinafter Creativity and Culture] (noting methods 
that creativity can stem from a shared cultural heritage); Julie E. Cohen, The 
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2005); 
Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 304 (1992); Liane Gabora, The 
Origin of Evolution of Culture and Creativity, 1 J. MEMETICS § 5 (1997), 
available at http://www.imagomundi.com.br/cultura/memes_gabora.pdf (“The 
ideas and inventions any one individual produces build on the ideas and 
inventions of others.”). 
 13. See Green, supra note 3, at 173 (noting that plagiarism does not credit 
the original source); David A. Thomas, How Educators Can More Effectively 
Understand and Combat the Plagiarism Epidemic, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
421, 422–23 (noting that plagiarism definitions must work around traditions 
of acceptable and unacceptable copying). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 11 (2007) (considering plagiarism as not 
necessarily literary theft). The Legal Writing Institute’s definition of 
plagiarism specifically refers to “literary property,” describing plagiarism as 
“[the t]aking [of] the literary property of another, passing it off as one’s own 
without appropriate attribution, and reaping from its use any benefit from an 
academic institution.” LEGAL WRITING INST., LAW SCHOOL PLAGIARISM V. 
PROPER ATTRIBUTION 2 (2003) [hereinafter LAW SCHOOL PLAGIARISM], 
available at http://www.lwionline.org /publications/plagiarism/policy.pdf. 
 14. See Green, supra note 3, at 174–75; see also Thomas, supra note 13, at 
426–28 (describing reasons why a student might decide to plagiarize another’s 
work); POSNER, supra note 13, at 11–12 (noting that theft is a misleading term 
but that classifying it as “borrowing” is also misleading). 
 15. The term “plagiarism” comes from the Latin word “plagiarius,” 
meaning a kidnapper. LANGENSCHEIDT’S POCKET LATIN DICTIONARY 242 
(1966); see also Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of 
Literary Authorship in Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 71 (2007); Jaime 
S. Dursht, Note, Judicial Plagiarism: It May Be Fair Use But is it Ethical?, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1996) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW DICTIONARY OF 
THE LANGUAGE 803 (1966)); Stearns, supra note 3, at 517 (citing 11 THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 947 (2d ed. 1989)). 
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forces them to work for the abductor.16 Plagiarism in the arts 
and literature involves: (1) an intentional taking, (2) of creative 
literary or artistic works of another, (3) without attribution, (4) 
passing them off as one’s own, (5) without adding significant 
artistic or literary value to the copied material, and (6) with the 
potential to reap an unearned benefit or earn an undeserved 
credit from the use.17 
The form of “naked copying” favored by commentators is 
copying that furthers First Amendment goals of communicating 
expression about culture, or one’s personal human condition, or 
other educational, historical, and archival uses of prior works.18 
Certain forms of copying—for archiving, transmission of 
knowledge, education, and self-expression—have enormous 
societal benefits that rival the public policies supporting the 
protection of intellectual property.19 There is a balance that 
must be struck when determining the limits of a copyright 
monopoly that curtails many forms of copying including the 
kinds of copying that benefit society. But nothing in this 
equation supports plagiarism. Plagiarism is neither a 
prescription nor a substitute for the creative goals of artists 
and designers who attempt to create works for the benefit of 
being known for and credited with the content of the works.20 
                                                          
 16. See Durantaye, supra note 15, at 71 (“The term initially referred to 
the kidnapping of free men and the selling of them into slavery.”); Dursht, 
supra note 15, at 1263 (“In Roman law, plagium was the act of stealing a slave 
from his master and was a criminal offense.”); Stearns, supra note 3, at 517 
(“The image [of plagiarism] is more nearly that of abduction into 
servitude . . . .”); see also ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 
95 (1952). 
 17. See LAW SCHOOL PLAGIARISM, supra note 13, at 2; Stearns, supra note 
3, at 516–17; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Creativity and Culture, supra note 12, at 1174–76; Guy 
Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization 
and its Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 82–83, 135–38 (2008); 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2565–
76 (2009); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and 
the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4–
5, 48–49 (2011); Copy This, supra note 1, at 545–48. 
 19. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Green, supra note 3, at 200–05; Stearns, supra note 3, at 543–44; 
Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural 
Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 151, 155–56 (2007) [hereinafter 
Payment in Credit] (“[F]an creators are usually highly concerned with proper 
attribution. Plagiarism . . . is one of the most serious offenses against the fan 
community, and when the plagiarism is discovered, fans are likely to publicly 
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Furthermore, “[w]hen a public figure is charged with 
plagiarism, the public concern is not primarily about protecting 
the possessory interests of the ‘owner’ of the stolen [works]. 
Instead, society sees itself as the victim of duplicity and is 
interested in passing judgment on the character of the 
plagiarist.”21 Plagiarism does not benefit society; it is a cheat 
and a fraud upon society.22 
Part of the confusion concerning the contours of copyright 
protection compared to the scope of the concept of plagiarism 
arises from the different policies supporting the two concepts.23 
Plagiarism is not about the issue of who should be able to 
exploit a valuable property right so much as it is concerned 
with the fairness of taking credit for ideas and insights one did 
not think up or imagine, and thereby cheating not only the true 
original thinker, but the entire community that bestows credit 
and accolades on original thinkers.24 Authors have described 
plagiarism as a defect in process and copyright infringement as 
a defect in result.25 Plagiarism has a mental component of 
cheating and intentional misrepresentation or misattribution, 
while copyright infringement has no mental component and 
only focuses on the end product and whether it is a copy or an 
unauthorized derivative work of the original regardless of the 
mental state of the copyist.26 In plagiarism, the end product has 
                                                          
excoriate the plagiarist.”). 
 21. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 1171, 1185 (2005). 
 22. See id. at 1184–85. “[C]ontrary to the impression one might gain from 
reading the many judicial opinions that conflate copyright infringement with 
plagiarism, there is no law prohibiting plagiarism and misattribution 
generally.” Id. at 1210–11. 
 23. See Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution, and 
Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3–6 (2005); Green, supra note 3, at 200–01; 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Plagiarism Problems in Higher Education, 13 J.C. & U.L. 
65, 87–90 (1986) [hereinafter Plagiarism Problems]. 
 24. See Dursht, supra note 15, at 1263–66; Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 14–
16; Green, supra note 3, at 234–35 (noting the effect on scholars who are 
plagiarized); Latourette, supra note 6, at 21; Stearns, supra note 3, at 529; see 
also Payment in Credit, supra note 20, at 155–56 (explaining the importance of 
lack of attribution or “credit” in plagiarism analysis compared to the 
unimportance of attribution in copyright-intellectual property analysis). 
 25. Dursht, supra note 15, at 1270 n.113; Stearns, supra note 3, at 524–
25. 
 26. See LINDEY, supra note 16, at 232; Jon M. Garon, Normative 
Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1290–91 (2003) (explaining that copyright is tied to the 
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little to do with the charge—even clever paraphrasing and 
creative compilations of other people’s thoughts would 
constitute plagiarism if the copyist has the mental state to steal 
and take credit for the stolen thoughts.27 Plagiarism is not a 
crime,28 but a violation of ethics, morality, and equity,29 and an 
act of fraud or negligent misrepresentation.30 Plagiarism, like 
other forms of piracy, receives little aid and comfort from legal 
theorists.31 
Artists and designers also might be confused by the fact 
that the scopes of enforcement of plagiarism and copyright 
infringement do not completely overlap.32 Plagiarism primarily 
is an ethical offense, not a crime or civil wrong, while 
unauthorized copying of creative works has been regulated by 
laws of intellectual property and, in particular, the copyright 
laws.33 Strangely enough, unlike plagiarism, willful copying for 
                                                          
reaping of unearned benefits); Latourette, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining that 
the intent of plagiarism is essential); Stearns, supra note 3, at 516–17. But see 
Green, supra note 3, at 181–86 (noting that requiring intent could give some 
plagiarists room to avoid punishment). 
 27. Dursht, supra note 15, at 1281 (“[P]lagiarism focuses on the process of 
copying.”); Latourette, supra note 6, at 22; Stearns, supra note 3, at 516–17. 
 28. Dursht, supra note 15, at 1258 (explaining that plagiarism is an 
ethical offense often prohibited by academic ethics codes); Latourette, supra 
note 6, at 18–19 Green, supra note 3, at 228–35, (discussing the propriety of a 
change in the law to criminalize plagiarism). 
 29. See Bast & Samuels, supra note 3, at 790; Dursht, supra note 15, at 
1256; Latourette, supra note 6, at 19; see also Yu v. Univ. of La Verne, 126 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 763, 767–68 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011); Hanifi v. Board of Regents, 
46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 131, 135 (1994) (noting plagiarist’s admissions that such conduct 
is unethical); In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 551–52 (Ill. 1982); Iowa Sup. Ct. 
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Iowa 2002); In re 
Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871, 879 (Minn. 1988) (Kelley, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the majority ruling allowing plagiarist to be admitted to the 
bar). 
 30. ST. ONGE, supra note 2, at 101; see also Lane, 642 N.W.2d at 300. 
 31. See, e.g., MARCEL C. LAFOLLETTE, STEALING INTO PRINT: FRAUD, 
PLAGIARISM, AND MISCONDUCT IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 1 (1992); LINDEY, 
supra note 16, at chs. 10, 14, 15; Robert D. Bills, Plagiarism in Law School: 
Close Resemblance of the Worst Kind?, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 103, 103 
(1990); Dursht, supra note 15, at 1281. 
 32. Band & Schruers, supra note, 23, at 3–6; Bast & Samuels, supra note 
3 at 790; Green, supra note 3, at 200–02; Samuel J. Horovitz, Note, Two 
Wrongs Don’t Negate a Copyright: Don’t Make Students Turn it in if You Won’t 
Give It Back, 60 FLA. L. REV. 229, 255–58 (2008); Plagiarism Problems, supra 
note 23, at 87–88. 
 33. Bast & Samuels, supra note 3, at 790–91; Merits of Copyright, supra 
note 1, at 1465; Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
2013] DIOS MIO 99 
 
personal gain and commercial distribution has been defined as 
a criminal offense.34 
The public policy behind the copyright laws is “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”35 Additionally, “[i]ts 
constitutional goal is to promote enlightenment, not retard it—
‘to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.’ The 
property rights it establishes must ‘ultimately serve the cause 
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and 
the other arts.’”36 
Copyright has carved out specific areas in which copying is 
held to be perfectly legal—the creation and recognition of a 
public domain (or public domains),37 the doctrine of originality 
with the supporting doctrines of merger and scènes à faire,38 
                                                          
Scènes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 
785–86 (2006) [hereinafter Copyright Originality] (“The artist or author’s 
creative expression and embodiment of the idea is protected.”). 
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); see also Steven K. Barton, Note, Felony 
Copyright Infringement in Schools, 1994 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 144–48 
(describing the elements necessary for the criminal offense); Geraldine Szott 
Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, 
Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (2003). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 36. James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
167, 218 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 37. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: 
Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 124–
135 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); James Boyle, The 
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 59–64 (2003); M. William Krasilovsky, 
Observations on the Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 205, 
205–06 (1967); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967–
68 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217–22 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse 
on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 784 (2006) (mentioning the possibility 
of multiple public domains); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public 
Domain: Threats and Opportunities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & 
Spring 2003, at 147, 148–53; see also David Lange, Recognizing the Public 
Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 passim (1981) (arguing that the 
scope of the public domain must be clear from encroachment by intellectual 
property rights). 
 38. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.03[B][3]–[4] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.  2012); Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: 
The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 91–92 (1989); Douglas 
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 734–39 (2003); 
Lateef Mtima, So Dark the Con(Tu) Of Man: The Quest for a Software 
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and the definition of what is infringement versus what is fair 
use39—to facilitate legally-recognized acts of copying. 
Because the overlap between plagiarism and copyright 
infringement is incomplete, an act of plagiarism may or may 
not be an act of copyright infringement, and the converse also 
is true.40 This is particularly true in the visual arts because 
copyright law precludes ideas from being copyrighted (i.e., from 
being protected from copying), and infringement requires the 
copying to be of a work, which is an expression of the ideas.41 If 
an act of copying implicates the theft of ideas and 
misattribution of a prior author’s ideas and insights to the 
credit of the copyist, it may well constitute an act of 
plagiarism.42 It will not constitute an act of copyright 
infringement unless the scenario includes the copying of a 
                                                          
Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 23, 94–99 (2007); 
Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–98. 
 39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (defining fair use); Barton Beebe, An 
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 549, 551–57 (2008) (using statistical analysis to describe the 
contradictions in fair use case law); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999) (describing how it is impossible to 
determine whether use is fair before litigation because of a balancing test); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 745–
49 (2009); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1106–07 (1990) (noting many gaps in fair use jurisprudence); Michael D. 
Murray, What is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the 
Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair 
Use Law, 11 CHIC.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012) [hereinafter What is 
Transformative?] (discussing how an explanatory synthesis demonstrates the 
operation of the transformative test); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense 
of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 719–20 (2011) (critiquing the four 
factor test used by courts); R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the 
Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 467–69 (2008); Elizabeth 
L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 
334–36 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 53–63 
(2012) (empirical study of fair use); Samuelson, supra note 18, at 2539–41 
(comprehensive study of fair use doctrine’s unpredictability). 
 40. See Band & Schruers, supra note 23, at 3–6; Bast & Samuels, supra 
note 3, at 790; Green, supra note 3, at 200–02; Horovitz, supra note 32, at 
255–58; Plagiarism Problems, supra note 23, at 87–88. 
 41. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Jon M. Garon, Playing in the 
Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through 
Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 477–78 (2008); 
Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–90; Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond 
Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 725, 758 (1993). 
 42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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particular form of expression of the ideas. Copying of public 
domain works or any copying permitted by the originality 
doctrines and fair use defenses will not be infringement, but it 
may well constitute plagiarism if the copyist potentially will 
receive personal recognition or benefit as the “creator” of the 
copied material.43 On the other hand, outside of the protections 
of the doctrines of originality and the public domain, and the 
fair use defenses mentioned here, the copying of one author’s 
work and incorporating it into a new work might constitute 
infringement no matter if the copyist gives proper attribution 
and recognition to the author and source of the copied material 
to such a degree that there is no possibility of a finding of 
plagiarism in the scenario. 
The distinction between plagiarism and copyright 
infringement is more powerful in theory than in practice.44 
Plagiarism almost always involves the copying of expression—
we would be at a loss to know what ideas have been taken by 
the plagiarist if not for the ability to trace the plagiarist’s 
expression to its unacknowledged source. In some disciplines of 
the arts and sciences, a plagiarist might steal an actual idea—a 
scholarly insight, a scientific discovery, or a historical 
conjecture—and attempt to obtain the recognition for the 
essential ideas represented by these concepts without much 
concern for whether or not the plagiarist actually copied the 
original words or forms in which the ideas once were expressed 
by the original author of the ideas.45 But in the visual arts, the 
concern is with the act of taking another artist’s works—
expressions, not ideas—without attribution and with the intent 
of gaining the credit and recognition for an act of creation.46 
Taking works, rather than the idea of works, still is an ethical 
wrong known as plagiarism even if copyright law does not 
afford the original artist or her heirs a cause of action because 
the work fell into the public domain or because the strength of 
the copyright over the original work was lessened by one of the 
                                                          
 43. See supra notes 37–39. 
 44. See Green, supra note 3, at 181–86 (explaining how unintentional 
plagiarism still falls within the scope of plagiarism, even though plagiarism is 
often distinguished from copyright by its mental element). 
 45. See Payment in Credit, supra note 20, at 155–56 (explaining how 
proper attribution is considered to be important by the community for fan 
created works). 
 46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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originality doctrines of merger or scènes à faire.47 The 
distinction revolves around the wrong defined by plagiarism—
misappropriation with the intent to receive a benefit from the 
theft—as opposed to copyright’s concern with allocation of the 
rights to use and exploit a valuable property right in 
expression. The Parts that follow trace the legal requirements 
of copyright law, copyright infringement, and fair use to define 
the legal and ethical path for artists and designers with respect 
to the works of other artists and designers. 
With regard to the right of publicity, very few uses of a 
celebrity name, image, or likeness have the tendency to impute 
the reputation and good will of the celebrity to the infringer in 
the sense that one would admire the person of the infringer for 
the same traits and attributes as the celebrity.48 Right of 
publicity violations are an exploitation of a celebrity’s name, 
image, and reputation, but the benefit sought generally is not 
personal or professional credit, an academic grade, or 
accolades.49 The infringer does not seek to be known as the 
celebrity; he or she merely seeks attention, marketing 
advantages, or other benefits from the misassociation of the 
star power of the celebrity with the infringer’s own works or 
activities. As a result, most violations of the right of publicity 
will not also constitute plagiarism. Therefore, simply reminding 
artists and designers of the concept of plagiarism is an 
incomplete prescription for proper treatment of others’ names, 
images, and likenesses. 
In the Parts that follow, I have synthesized the ethical and 
moral underpinnings of plagiarism with the public policy 
underlying copyright and right of publicity law to make a more 
complete statement of legal and ethical behavior with respect 
                                                          
 47. See supra note 38. In essence, the originality doctrines allow copying 
when the material copied was not and could not have been copyrighted. If the 
original work is limited by the merger doctrine (there are only a limited 
number of ways to express the concept, and both authors used one of these 
limited ways), or scènes à faire (both authors used a stock scene, a natural, 
realistic depiction of the same object, or some other necessary phrasing or 
depiction “that must be done” to express the idea of the scene), then there will 
be no grounds for a claim of copyright infringement even if the scenario reeks 
of plagiarism. See Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–89, 794. 
 48. See Leval, supra note 39, at 1132 (noting the ease of copying and 
undercutting tangible goods, such as fabric patterns, fashion accessories, and 
toys). 
 49. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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to the works and the names and images of other artists, 
designers, and celebrities. In spite of the distinctions between 
the ethical conception of plagiarism and the legal definitions of 
copyright and right of publicity infringement, the end result is 
the same recommendation, “Don’t Include Other’s Stuff.” 
B. COPYING AS PLAGIARISM UNDER COPYRIGHT AND RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY LAW50 
Plagiarism is unethical.51 The act of copying with the 
intention and expectation of receiving credit for the copied 
material is plagiarism.52 Plagiarism is not excusable as self-
expression or self-actualization when the act of copying is to 
gain credit for someone else’s creative act.53 
Artists and designers seek to create. The application of the 
creative faculties of the mind to the creation of art works and 
designs is the exact activity toward which artists and designers 
devote their talents. It is easy to understand the measure of 
achievement and distinction in the arts and design world: it is 
to be known for being original, not derivative, to produce new 
works of distinction and individual genius, not to replicate the 
works of the past. The appellations, “derivative” or “copycat,” in 
the arts and design world are as damning an appellation as 
being called a “plagiarist” in the literary and academic world. 
Replication is a short-cut, not an achievement of merit. 
Fortunately, copyright law recognizes the priority of the 
creation of new, non-duplicative, non-derivative works as being 
the quintessential achievement for copyright purposes too. 
Thus, striving for achievement and distinction in the arts and 
design world produces successful legal and ethical results 
under copyright law. 
 
                                                          
 50. As mentioned previously, the research that produced this Article was 
motivated by an invitation from the National Center for Professional & 
Research Ethics to prepare an Ethics CORE Encyclopedia article on ethics and 
intellectual property for artists and designers. Michael D. Murray, The Ethics 
of Intellectual Property: An Ethical Approach to Copyright and Right of 
Publicity Law (July 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013463. Also see 
information provided in the author’s biography at the beginning of this Article. 
 51. See supra notes 28–30. 
 52. See supra notes 3, 12–13, 24 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Stearns, supra note 3, at 514. 
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1. The Copyright Originality Requirement and Its Parallels to 
Publicity Law 
The creation of original expression is the essential 
requirement for a copyrightable work.54 “The sine qua non of 
copyright is originality.”55 Originality is the very “premise of 
copyright law.”56 
The definition of original is “not copied,”57 rather than 
something that is entirely new, fresh, novel, and excessively 
creative.58 “Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be 
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as 
the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”59 
Nevertheless, this definition feeds directly into the 
recommended approach to the fair and ethical use of others’ 
works: if you do not copy, you will be playing fairly with others’ 
works and you will be creating works that will be copyrightable 
in the process. 
Copyright law is concerned only with the copying of words 
and images that constitute expressions of ideas.60 In copyright 
law, the idea-expression distinction prevents copyright from 
quashing new, original expression derived from the ideas 
depicted or embodied in other works by forbidding the exercise 
of copyright protection over ideas, including themes, 
                                                          
 54. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 247–48 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973). 
 55. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 56. Id. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 
1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 57. Id. at 346–47; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 
58 (1884); The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 58. Feist, 499 U.S. at  345; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) 
(“[C]opyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention . . . .”). In 
contrast, patent protection requires an invention that is novel and nonobvious. 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006). 
 59. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 60. See Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 785–86; Raymond T. 
Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Software Copyright: Sliding Scales and 
Abstracted Expression, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 317, 323, 331–32 (1995); Pamela 
Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 319–20 (2003); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a 
Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 684–85, 
710–12 (2012) (explaining that copyright began with the protection of words 
alone and has struggled to fit images into its scheme). 
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techniques, processes, and procedures.61 The idea-expression 
distinction preserves certain forms of copying of ideas from 
copyright infringement because they result in new, original 
expression that is not traced back to an earlier source—in other 
words, the artist or designer is not credited with the invention 
or conception of the technique, process, or procedure in the arts, 
or with the theme, genre, or device in the arts or literature, but 
simply with the new, original expression embodying the idea.62 
Many artists may follow a formula or genre for artistic or 
literary success, and copyright law recognizes that by defining 
genre and formula as ideas that may be used by any and all 
artists and authors under the idea-expression distinction.63 We 
are quite comfortable with hundreds of modern and 
contemporary mystery-crime-detective writers and confuse 
none of them with Wilkie Collins or Edgar Allan Poe. We are 
quite taken with scores of modern and contemporary 
impressionistic painters, and confuse none of them with Monet, 
Renoir, or Morisot. But a plagiarist seeking recognition for 
content—expression—copied from another artist receives our 
ire for this unethical trick.64 
Right of publicity law defines and protects the right to 
control the use of one’s name, image, likeness, or other valuable 
attributes of one’s persona by others when others seek to use 
these things for personal gain or commercial advantage.65 
There is no idea-expression distinction in right of publicity law; 
the celebrity’s image and likeness are the subject matter of the 
right, and there is no “idea” of a celebrity that is free to all for 
                                                          
 61. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Garon, supra note 41, at 477–
78; Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–89; Rotstein, supra note 41, at 
758 (noting that courts and scholars have found the distinction difficult to 
apply); Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 265, 307–08 (2007). 
 62. See Garon, supra note 41, at 477–78. 
 63. See Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 791. 
 64. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. Forgery is another 
unethical and illegal behavior involving copying, but it is the inverse of 
plagiarism because the forger seeks no recognition (or blame) for the copy, and 
only seeks to have it falsely attributed to the original artist. See Stearns, 
supra note 3, at 517. 
 65. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2009); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344 (West 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
46 (1995); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 
3:2 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY]. 
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reproduction or new expression.66 Therefore, even expression 
that calls the celebrity to mind without reproducing the actual 
image or likeness of the celebrity is actionable.67 
An element of the right of publicity offense is the gaining of 
an advantage from the exploitation of a valuable celebrity 
persona, which matches the mental state of plagiarism which 
seeks credit or benefit from the exploitation of another’s 
valuable ideas.68 The two wrongs are parallel rather than 
overlapping, but result in the same ethical recommendation not 
to exploit another person for personal gain. This pushes the 
discussion toward answering the question of what is 
exploitation versus what is fair use, which will be discussed 
further below. 
2. The Relationship Between Originality and Creativity 
Originality is connected to creativity, but only in the 
following manner: a copyrightable work must be created—it 
must be a work of authorship “founded in the creative powers 
of the mind.”69 When combined, the two requirements mean 
that a copyrightable work is one that is not copied and is 
conceived of by the author. 
                                                          
 66. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The 
“Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right 
of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 1, 32–33, 52, 70–71 (2003); Peter Johnson, Can You Quote Donald 
Duck?: Intellectual Property in Cyberculture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 451, 462–
63 (2001) (reviewing ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 
(1998)); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of 
Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 252–54 (2002); David S. Welkowitz & 
Tyler T. Ochoa, Teaching Rights of Publicity: Blending Copyright and 
Trademark, Common Law and Statutes, and Domestic and Foreign Law, 52 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 905, 910 (2008); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 
989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 67. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (finding that robot animation called to mind Vanna White’s “Wheel 
of Fortune” persona); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 
831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that product name called to mind Johnny 
Carson’s “Tonight Show” persona). 
 68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 69. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) 
(quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)); see also Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003) (addressing the issue of whether 
Congressional copyright extensions address Constitutional requirements for 
originality and creativity). 
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The works which are to be protected by copyright must be 
“the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, 
prints, engravings, and the like.”70 The creativity required does 
not have to be at a genius level: “[T]he requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. 
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or 
obvious’ it might be.”71 
The definition of creativity in copyright law may be 
comforting to those who question their own innovativeness and 
uniqueness—the law sets a low bar for creative aptitude and 
imagination—but the definition does communicate a 
meaningful message when coupled with the legal requirement 
of originality and the ethical prohibition against plagiarism: it 
means your creative inspiration cannot revolve around copying 
the work of another artist. 
Plagiarism does not automatically produce inferior works—
in fact, although it is ironic to note it, plagiarism of great 
works, embodying great ideas, superior technique, and 
impressive creativity, often produces a result that is superior in 
many ways to works that plagiarists might have produced on 
their own.72 The problem is that plagiarized works are not 
“new” although they appear to be new, they are not a product of 
the hand or the mind of the plagiarist, although they appear to 
be, and they are attributed and credited to the plagiarist at the 
expense of the original creator in a manner that cheats the 
audience of the “new” works.73 In a legal sense, the copyright 
originality and creativity elements require works to be new, not 
copied, and require a creation that is conceived of by the mind 
and executed by the hand or at the direction of the artist.74 
Fulfilling these same elements also will avoid a charge of 
plagiarism regarding creative works that are to be attributed to 
                                                          
 70. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 
(1879)); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211 (noting that there is a narrow 
category of works where copyright cannot exist); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
213–15 (1954) (explaining that the scope of such rights is granted by 
Congress). 
 71. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 1.08[C][1], 2.01[A]–[B] (1990)). 
 72. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 60; Horovitz, supra note 32, at 257–58; 
Stearns, supra note 3, at 519. 
 73. See Stearns, supra note 3, at 519. 
 74. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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the artist. 
3. Plagiarism Is Not the Same As Following Techniques, 
Ideas, Methods, or Processes of Creation Under the Idea-
Expression Distinction 
Artists and designers reading copyright’s requirements 
may be puzzled by the apparent disconnect with their own 
artistic training and education. Art training involves copying—
one practices the lessons of the past by copying the works of the 
past. One demonstrates the development of artistic skills by 
showing that one can duplicate the works that exhibit these 
skills. Notably: 
Although imitation is an inevitable component of creation, plagiarists 
pass beyond the boundaries of acceptable imitation by copying from 
the work of others without improving upon the copied material or 
fully assimilating it into their own work; by failing to attribute the 
copied material to its actual author; and by intending to deceive 
others about its origin.75 
In truth, there is no disconnect between the advice not to 
copy and the training an artist receives in arts education. 
There is only a clarification: works that an artist wants to 
copyright may not be copies of other works, and any works that 
are to be offered for sale or for any other personal benefit may 
not be copies of other works.76 This not only is advice for the 
ethical treatment of other artists, it also is legal advice for how 
to produce copyrightable works under the originality 
requirement and to avoid liability for copyright infringement.77 
                                                          
 75. Stearns, supra note 3, at 520. 
 76. It is possible that students might be required to complete an 
assignment for a grade in school that calls for them to copy certain works—for 
example, an assignment or portfolio requirement that contemplates 
submission of copied works to demonstrate the mastery of an artistic skill or 
the achievement of a certain level of performance. This practice does not 
implicate the copyright laws unless the students further attempt to promote 
themselves beyond the academic setting using the copied works or if they 
attempt to sell or license the copied works outright. See supra notes 34–37 and 
accompanying text. In addition, I am not suggesting that plagiarized works or 
copied works in general are uniformly acceptable as student work product in 
academic settings; in general, plagiarized works would not be acceptable and 
would constitute an academic violation. Students must be careful to know and 
understand the requirements of their department and institution regarding 
the copying of works for academic assignments. 
 77. See generally LEONARD D. DUBOFF, MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY 
KING, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, Booklet P 86–87 (2010) [hereinafter 
DUBOFF, MURRAY & KING, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW]; LEONARD D. DUBOFF, 
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On the other hand, nothing prevents an artist or designer 
from learning from and employing other people’s artistic ideas, 
techniques, methods, or processes of creation. As discussed 
above, the idea-expression distinction in copyright law allows 
ideas to be exploited,78 not works (expressions of ideas).79 The 
concept of “ideas” in copyright law encompasses techniques, 
methods, procedures, and processes; thus an “idea,” even a 
technique or method of creation, can be copied, but not the 
works themselves (expressions of the idea) produced using the 
technique or method of creation.80 This is a significant 
distinction regarding copyright law and the other intellectual 
property protections of patent and trade secret law which 
protect inventions and innovations.81 
An illustration is in order: glass artist A and glass artist B 
both work as gaffers (glass blowers and shapers) in the studio 
of master glass artist C. Glass artists A and B both study the 
methods and techniques of glass blowing and glass shaping 
used by the master artist C, and from time to time, they 
individually execute and create the glass sculptures conceived 
of and designed by the master artist. After several years, both 
A and B decide to go out on their own and produce their own 
glass sculptures. A uses the techniques learned on the job to 
execute and create A’s own conceptions and designs for glass 
sculpture, and A produces works that are fully copyrightable 
and do not infringe on master artist C’s works because A did 
not attempt to copy any of C’s works.82 B, on the other hand, 
                                                          
SHERRI BURR, & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, ART LAW ch. 2 (Aspen 2010) 
[hereinafter DUBOFF, BURR & MURRAY, ART LAW]. 
 78. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 79. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 349–50 (1991); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
 80. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also supra note 79. 
 81. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (discussing patents); 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) 
(discussing trademarks). 
 82. This scenario intends to focus attention on the copyright issues 
presented by the idea-expression distinction and the fact that artistic methods, 
techniques, processes, and procedures are not subject to copyright. It is 
possible that this scenario could implicate other rights of master artist C, such 
as a potential trade-secret right, or it could implicate an employee 
confidentiality agreement or covenant not to compete agreement between the 
employer and the two employees of this scenario, if such an agreement were in 
place between the parties. In theory, C might have patented one or more of the 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
110 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
sought to gain some attention and obtain a leg up in the glass 
art world by going out of his way to use the techniques B 
learned in C’s studio to produce works that closely resemble C’s 
works. Because B is skillful at glass blowing and because B set 
out to copy C’s works, B’s works duplicate C’s works and are 
often confused with C’s works at art shows and in galleries. B’s 
works may well be held to be copies of C’s works, and thus 
unoriginal and not copyrightable, and may further subject B to 
liability for copyright infringement of C’s copyrighted works. 
The purpose of this illustration is to show that artistic 
training in the processes and procedures of other artists is 
necessary and expected, and does not lead to copyright 
infringement unless and until the trained artist decides to 
employ the acquired skills to duplicate or even to closely mimic 
the works of other artists.83 
Mimicry deserves special attention. On the one hand, 
copyright law protects original artists from those who would 
seek to mimic the works of the artists through the copyright 
derivative works right owned by the copyright owner of the 
work.84 On the other hand, the idea-expression dichotomy, 
discussed above, allows artists to create works that follow the 
same formula, genre, or technique as the works produced by 
earlier artists. The ethical, plagiaristic difference is one of 
intent while the legal, copyright law difference is one of result. 
In plagiarism, as exhibited by artist B in the illustration 
above, the second artist sought to make her works appear the 
same as master artist C’s works. It was not simply a 
resemblance caused by the two artists working in the same 
medium using similar techniques. This mimicry was intended 
                                                          
processes and procedures used in C’s studio, in which case neither A nor B 
would automatically be entitled to employ the patented procedure in the 
creation of their own glass works. The successful patenting of an artistic 
process would be the exception, not the rule; it would be much more likely that 
C did not obtain a patent and that A and B would have the ability to use all of 
the non-patented artistic procedures on their own outside of their employment 
with C absent a trade secret or employment agreement restriction that 
prevents it. 
 83. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547–49; see also Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining that 
infringement becomes increasingly possible as the level of abstraction becomes 
more concrete, and more detail is shared between the original and the alleged 
infringing copy). 
 84. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
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to cause confusion in the audience for the works, the confusion 
being that B’s works were produced by C. In copyright law, the 
derivative works right affords the owner of the copyright to the 
original work the right to make or authorize the creation of all 
adaptations, alterations, translations, and conversions of the 
original work into new works.85 It protects the original owner 
from copyists who seek to produce noticeably similar works 
based on the first work, but who make a few variations and do 
not exactly duplicate the first work;86 the copyist need only take 
a portion of the desirable features (more than a trivial amount, 
but not necessarily the heart) of the original work to be guilty 
of copyright infringement for creating an unauthorized 
derivative work.87 Infringement by the creation of a derivative 
work does not require proof of a certain mental state, but the 
law will attempt to make distinctions between innocent 
practitioners of the same genre, medium, or art form, whose 
works share some resemblance, and those who produce 
substantially similar looking works that replicate a portion of 
the desirable features of the original work. In a perfect world, it 
would be obvious and effortless to discern who had copied and 
who had simply followed similar techniques common to the 
medium or genre of art. In reality, attorneys will solicit proof 
that the artist followed completely innocent practices of 
creation, or questionable practices of mimicry and outright 
plagiarism. Thus, when the inquiry may eventually reach into 
the artist’s process of creation—What inspired this work when 
you created it? Were you thinking of another work at that time? 
Did you look at other works by other artists at that time?—the 
advice remains not to set out to copy other artists’ works in the 
first place. 
Innocently following the method and techniques of a 
certain school or genre of art will sometimes result in two 
artists producing works that are similar to each other. This 
kind of accidental similarity is accepted and permitted under 
                                                          
 85. Id.; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220–21 (1990); cf. Harper 
& Row, 471 U.S. at 549–50. 
 86. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547–49; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
 87. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. Compare 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980), with 
Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d 
Cir. 1977). This is a comparison suggested by the Supreme Court in Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 549–50. 
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copyright law as long as the similarity is “fortuitous, not the 
result of copying.”88 Although the concept of accidental 
similarity is known and accepted as a possible occurrence 
outside of situations of copying, in cases of substantial 
similarity or near-exact-similitude between two works of two 
different artists, it may be difficult for the second artist to 
convince a court that the similarity was fortuitous, and not the 
product of copying. If the second artist had no ability to see or 
access the first work, the argument becomes much stronger. If 
the second artist never looks to copy or mimic the works of 
other artists, the argument practically speaking will be 
unnecessary; the likelihood that the second artist will 
innocently and accidentally replicate another artist’s works to 
the degree of substantial similarity or near-exact-similitude 
that would bring a copyright infringement claim to bear is 
negligible. 
The copyright law doctrines of merger and scènes à faire 
also allow for similarity arising from the common subject 
matter of two different artists’ works,89 as where the two artists 
both attempt to depict the same scene or real-world subject 
matter, such as by creating a realistic depiction of an animal, a 
flower, the Grand Canyon at sunrise, or a texture-free 
application of red acrylic paint on a square, flat canvas. The 
term, scènes à faire, roughly translates to “scenes that must be 
done”—an “obligatory scene” with necessary elements of 
depiction required in order to communicate the meaning of the 
depiction to an audience.90 For ethical artists and designers, 
the concept means that similarity between two works that is 
caused by the requirements of a successful, meaningful 
depiction of the same subject matter is acceptable, while 
similarity caused by one artist’s copying of the other artist’s 
                                                          
 88. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 89. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[B][4]; see also Kurtz, supra 
note 38, at 79, 86, 89–91 (arguing that authors build from their predecessors); 
Lichtman, supra note 38, at 734–39 (stating that under the merger doctrine, 
copyright protection is denied when there are only a few ways to express an 
idea to prevent monopolization of the market); Mtima, supra note 38, at 94–
99; Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 784–99. 
 90. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03; Kurtz, supra note 38, at 
86, 89; see also Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of 
Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1542–44 (2011) (describing 
court interpretations of stock imagery). 
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work is not.91 Only the points of similarity directly attributable 
to the subject matter are excusable; each artist can protect 
their individual artistic rendition and embellishments that 
exceed the points of similarity dictated by the subject matter.92 
Once again, it might come down to a matter of proof, and 
having an honest account of choosing a certain subject matter 
and producing the depiction without reference to the work of 
any other artist who also depicts this subject matter will put an 
artist on a strong footing. 
Similarity that is traced to a method of production and not 
to an act of copying also is protected by the originality 
doctrine.93 Artists cannot obtain a “copyright” over their artistic 
processes and procedures, and other artists are free to observe, 
adapt, reverse-engineer, and employ even the most innovative 
processes and procedures for the creation of original art 
without running afoul of the copyright laws.94 Thus, copyright 
does not set a trap for students receiving traditional artistic 
training in art schools, university departments, and studios 
that threatens to turn each project they work on using the 
skills they have learned from other artists into a continuous 
process of copyright infringement. 
4. The Parallels of Plagiarism and the Exploitation of a 
Celebrity’s Name, Image, or Likeness 
Exploitation through plagiarism parallels the concept of 
exploitation through misuse of a celebrity’s name, image, or 
likeness in right of publicity law. As discussed above, the 
prohibitions parallel each other, but they do not overlap 
completely, because the benefits gained by a copyist from the 
exploitation of a celebrity’s persona generally are not self-
aggrandizing benefits such as professional or academic credit.95 
Artists and designers exploit celebrities for the attractive power 
                                                          
 91. See Subotnik, supra note 90, at 1543 (arguing that there is an 
underlying idea of fairness in using things within the public domain). 
 92. Id. at 1544 (noting that photographers often use the same subject but 
produce different depictions of that subject). 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 94. See supra note 83. There is a possibility that the artist would run into 
a trade secret, employment agreement, or patent law issue, but not a 
copyright issue—unless the second artist copied the actual works of the first 
artist. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (exempting processes and procedures from 
copyrightability). 
 95. See supra notes 17, 19, 68 and accompanying text. 
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of their name and image or for the symbolic, expressive power 
of their persona, but rarely in a manner that causes the public 
to confuse the celebrity’s attributes with the attributes of the 
artist or designer. Nevertheless, right of publicity law prohibits 
uses of a celebrity’s persona that are self-serving and that 
constitute unfair and unethical exploitation, providing the 
connection with the ethical prohibition on plagiarism.96 
The advice not to copy other people’s works under 
copyright law extends to the use of a celebrity’s name, image, or 
likeness under right of publicity law: if you want to remain 
ethical and liability-free, do not use other people’s names, 
images, or likenesses in your art. If you find yourself compelled 
to use a celebrity name, image, or likeness, carefully follow the 
advice and recommendations here that explain the difference 
between expressive, creative uses that require the use of the 
celebrity’s identifiable and recognizable attributes, and uses 
that amount to crass exploitation of the star-power of the 
celebrity. 
The right of publicity is a right to control the use of one’s 
name, image, likeness, or other valuable attributes of one’s 
persona by others, when others seek to use these things for 
personal gain or commercial advantage.97 The right of publicity 
typically is classified as an intellectual property right98—“the 
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial 
use of his or her identity.”99 While there are many connections 
and overlapping features of publicity rights and other 
intellectual property rights (particularly copyright), there are 
also differences, and artists and designers should alert 
themselves to these differences. 
In the case of copyright and the right of publicity, not all of 
the requirements and public policies supporting the two rights 
                                                          
 96. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 97. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra 
note 65, at § 3.2. 
 98. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(stating that the right of publicity is an intellectual property right); see also, 
e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “intellectual 
property” as including publicity rights); J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. 
Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1712  
(1987) (“The right of publicity [has] matured into a distinctive legal category 
occupying an important place in the law of intellectual property.”). 
 99. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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of action are the same. Further, defenses that are effective 
against one are not automatically effective against the other. 
For example, originality and creativity are not requirements for 
right of publicity protection100 (for which many pop stars and 
celebrities of the moment should be grateful). Nevertheless, 
publicity rights are extended to persons to control or bar uses 
that exploit the value of their names, images, or likenesses in 
ways that exactly parallel the rights of the owners of original, 
copyrightable works.101 Copyright fair uses generally apply in 
right of publicity actions, but not exactly in a one-to-one 
correspondence that would allow for fairly simple legal 
analyses and straight-forward predictions regarding one kind 
of artistic use of a celebrity image compared to another.102 
The right of publicity is complicated by a number of 
historical anomalies that led to a messy establishment of a 
right of action. One, the right was initially conceived of as a 
right of privacy claim, focusing on use of a name, image or 
likeness as being an intrusion into one’s personal sphere, with 
resulting injuries to one’s person (e.g., feelings, reputation, or 
standing in the community).103 Two, the right later morphed 
                                                          
 100. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity 
Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163–66, 1190 (2006) 
(arguing that similar to trademark law, the right of publicity is not concerned 
with the encouragement of new creation but protection of names and integrity 
in commercial contexts); Dougherty, supra note 66, at 27–28 (concluding that 
transformative works recognize separate value and creativity within the work, 
and transformative works do not violate the right of publicity); Michael 
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993) (arguing that right of publicity is 
about determining the meaning of images); Steven Semeraro, Property’s End: 
Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
753, 775–81 (2011) (arguing that right of publicity assists celebrities with 
maximizing profit). 
 101. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 
(2d Cir. 1953) (advancing publicity law away from privacy law, and holding 
publicity law protects the public value of a celebrity image); see also Marshall 
Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB. L. REV. 
1357, 1360 (2007). 
 102. See infra Part III (describing fair uses in copyright and right of 
publicity law). 
 103. ETW, 332 F.3d at 952–53; PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 65, § 
1.11; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1167–71 (presenting a 
comprehensive history of the right of privacy); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (arguing that 
with the advancement in civilization, privacy requires a need for personal 
protection). 
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into a property right claim, protecting the commercial value of 
a celebrity name, image, or likeness from unauthorized 
exploitation of that monetary value.104 Three, the right has 
never been tied to one set of public policy goals that would 
allow for a more orderly evaluation of the rights of publicity 
against other important rights, such as free speech and artistic 
expression.105 This has an impact on the use of celebrity images 
and likenesses: it is considered less “fair” to use an image if the 
harm is characterized as a personal injury rather than simply a 
harm to a pecuniary or property right. Torts (i.e., personal 
injuries) usually are not excused simply because the actor had 
a motive to communicate. On the other hand, expression of 
news, social commentary, or education may be all that is 
required to balance out a use as “fair” compared to a person’s 
pecuniary interest in their name, image, or likeness. 
There are four public policies that support the extension of 
publicity rights: (1) direct reward to artists, performers, 
entertainers, and athletes for achievement in their areas;106 (2) 
indirect support to artists, performers, entertainers, and 
athletes to encourage them to strive to excel so as to benefit the 
public at large with better arts, literature, entertainment, and 
sports (this being the exact public policy supporting the 
extension of copyright and patent intellectual property 
rights);107 (3) equitable considerations of fairness and 
prevention of unjust enrichment and unfair competition (which 
has more overlap with the policies supporting the trademark 
laws which seek to avoid consumer confusion and unfair 
                                                          
 104. ETW, 332 F.3d at 952–53; Haelan, 202 F.2d at 866; W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984); 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1170–73. 
 105. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1172–73 (explaining that the 
court did not tie its decision to specific policy justifications rather than to a 
broader context). 
 106. Madow, supra note 100, at 205–17 (explaining various economic 
incentives that directly benefit artists); see also Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is 
Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 
310–14, 321–31 (2011) (arguing the importance of recognizing celebrity value). 
 107. Madow, supra note 100, at 206–09 (arguing that celebrities foster 
their talent to benefit society as a whole); Bartholomew, supra note 106, at 
321–31 (arguing that celebrity’s actions are for the public spotlight); see also 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 246–47 (2003) (arguing that “authors” under 
copyright law are not the primary beneficiaries of the public benefits of the 
law). 
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competition);108 and (4) outright theft of something valuable 
and marketable that is referred to as good will, star power, or 
simply publicity value.109 Again, the fact that there are four 
policies makes the law complicated for attorneys, judges, and 
legislators seeking to interpret, apply, or advance the law, as 
well as for artists and designers seeking to walk a safe path 
under the law, because the public policies do not always argue 
in favor of the same extension of rights and the same defenses 
against the rights. Artistic expression is regarded as a worthy 
activity, but it carries less force when weighed in a 
consideration of equity (the artist took for free what others 
regularly pay for), rather than in a balancing of one public good 
(encouragement of celebrities and athletes to improve their 
craft and sport for the good of the public) against another (free, 
uninhibited expression of the meaning, message, role, or 
function of the celebrity or athlete in the modern world for the 
good of the public). The analysis returns to the purpose of the 
activity and whether, on balance, it appears to promote First 
Amendment values, or whether it amounts to exploitation. 
Exploitation in the right of publicity context, as in 
plagiarism, requires an artist to use the celebrity’s name, 
image, or likeness for some advantage. The public policies 
behind right of publicity law have converged to require that the 
advantage must be one that benefits the user in a manner that 
does not directly serve First Amendment values of 
commentary, criticism, news reporting, and education of public 
affairs.110 In other words, the artist’s or designer’s purpose—
                                                          
 108. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th 
Cir. 1983); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 
cmt.c (1995); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 
70 IND. L.J. 47, 54–55 (1994). 
 109. See C.B.C. Distribution, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (arguing that dilution 
of a person’s identity might occur). 
 110. H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A 
New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLA. J.L. & ARTS 1, 15–16, 20–
23 (1992); Daniel E. Wanat, Entertainment Law: An Analysis of Judicial 
Decision-Making in Cases Where a Celebrity’s Publicity Right Is in Conflict 
with a User’s First Amendment Right, 67 ALB. L. REV. 251, 271–77 (2003); see 
also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 955 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(identifying the tension between the right of publicity and First Amendment 
Rights); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803–08 
(Cal. 2001). 
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her predominant purpose111—in using the celebrity’s persona 
must be self-serving in greater proportion than the service paid 
in First Amendment activities that substantially benefit the 
public.112 The need to accommodate First Amendment concerns 
causes the courts to concentrate heavily on the artist’s 
predominant purpose in using the celebrity name, image, or 
likeness. To be sure, not every expressive use of a celebrity’s 
persona is predominantly expressive in a way that benefits 
First Amendment concerns more than the concerns over the 
exploitation of the celebrity star power. Many expressive uses 
are held to be predominantly self-serving and exploitative. 
Newspapers, television broadcasters, bloggers, artists, or 
designers want to be known for good works, increase their 
following, increase sales of the newspaper or advertising 
revenues on the blog or broadcast, or simply increase their own 
stature in their community; however, the law accepts these 
pecuniary advantages and focuses instead on the predominant 
purpose of the activity and whether, on balance, the activity 
fulfills First Amendment goals and public policies over any 
collateral exploitation at work in the case.113 
The advantage may be as obvious as trying to market or 
advertise one’s own artworks using the celebrity’s name, image, 
or likeness as an attention-getter or simply to suggest some 
kind of approval (e.g., sponsorship, endorsement) by the 
celebrity of the artist’s works. An unauthorized “advertising” 
use would certainly run afoul of the publicity laws.114 But it 
                                                          
 111. I use the term, “predominant purpose,” in part because the case law 
gravitates to this term. See, e.g., ETW, 332 F.3d at 959; Winter v. DC Comics, 
69 P.3d 473, 478 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809; Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The law recognizes 
that multiple purposes for use of a name, image, or likeness most often are at 
play in the activity. 
 112. ETW, 332 F.3d at 955–59; Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968–72 (10th Cir. 1996); Winter, 69 P.3d at 478; 
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 806–09; Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 370–74. 
 113. Compare ETW, 332 F.3d at 959 (arguing for a predominantly 
expressive purpose in a painting and serigraph series that depicted several 
scenes from Tiger Woods’ historic first winning of the Masters major golf 
tournament), with Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–
78 (1977) (demonstrating the power of the right of publicity when the Court 
failed to uphold the First Amendment rights of a television news broadcaster 
that aired the public interest news information about a county fair performer 
and exploited the performer’s human cannonball act); see also Winter, 69 P.3d 
at 478; Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809; Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
 114. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–1005 (9th Cir. 
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could be a use of the celebrity’s name, image, or likeness simply 
to improve the quality, content, and value of the works 
themselves, as in the case where an artist’s paintings of generic 
golfers do not sell, but the artist’s paintings of an instantly 
recognizable Tiger Woods sell like hotcakes. Even though 
expressive use of the image has First Amendment value, the 
use might be viewed as an unfair advantage taken by the artist 
that amounts to a violation of Woods’ right of publicity.115 The 
advantage to the artist need not be large. If the artist has a 
purpose and intention in mind that obviously exceeds mere 
exploitation of the celebrity’s star power, the use of the 
celebrity’s name, image, or likeness may be approved as a “fair 
use” as discussed in the next Part. 
 
III. MODIFY IT OBVIOUSLY—THE ETHICS OF 
TRANSFORMATION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS OR 
CELEBRITY IMAGES OR LIKENESS 
The doctrine of fair use in copyright law was created and 
developed to further the same goals as the constitutional 
protection of copyrights and patents: “To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts,”116 as well as to protect the 
constitutional First Amendment goals of open and robust free 
expression.117 Fair use is one of the main reasons why the 
Supreme Court holds that the copyright monopoly on 
replication of copyrighted works does not violate the First 
Amendment’s limits on content-based restraints of 
expression.118 The value of writings and creations to the 
                                                          
2010); Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988); Bosley v. 
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 
373–74. 
 115. But see ETW, 332 F.3d at 959 (arguing that the artist balanced the 
expressive purpose over the exploitative purpose in the  depiction of scenes 
from Tiger Woods’ historic first winning of the Masters major golf 
tournament). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 117. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing against repression of 
speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for the free trade of ideas). 
 118. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 246–47 (2003); Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547–50 (1985). 
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progress of science and the arts is that they are new—not 
copied—and therefore, “original.” The creation and 
promulgation of new expression also is a core objective of the 
First Amendment.119 Thus, the ethical use and treatment of 
existing works is intended to further the creation of new, all-
original content or obviously modified content. “Obviously 
modified content” is new expression, not the same as the 
original. And like the copyright originality standard itself, 
modification and transformation do not require uniqueness or 
one-of-a-kind status, but they do require new expression. 
Fair use always has involved the examination of the user’s 
motive: Was it to steal or to create? Was it to avoid the 
drudgery of thinking up original works, or was it to build on 
works through obvious transformation so as to create 
“something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message”?120 A more succinct question is, was the motive to be 
expressive or exploitative? Thus, the concepts of transformation 
and predominant purpose dominate the discussion of copyright 
fair use.121 
Right of publicity fair uses also are drawn directly from 
First Amendment freedom of expression principles.122 The 
recognized defenses are: comment and criticism, artistic 
expression, news reporting of newsworthy events, and 
advertising and promotion of the speaker’s activities relating to 
one of the above uses.123 
                                                          
 119. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–91 (2012); United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–86 (2010). 
 120. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 121. See What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 1–3 (discussing the 
convergence of transformation and predominant purpose within copyright 
law). 
 122. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–10 (9th Cir. 
2010) (discussing the use of the transformative test and public interest 
defense, both grounded in First Amendment principles); C.B.C. Distribution & 
Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 819 
(8th Cir. 2007); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 
(Cal. 2001) (discussing the application of First Amendment to the publicity 
context of baseball cards). 
 123. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c 
(1995); DUBOFF, MURRAY, & KING, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 77, at 
Bk. S; DUBOFF, BURR, & MURRAY, ART LAW, supra note 77, at ch. 5; see also 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(defending works of artistic expression); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 
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In spite of its different origins in the law, right of publicity 
law recognizes the two steps of transformation and 
predominant purpose directly in its fair use analyses. The 
transformative requirement is met by the alteration of the 
content, meaning, and expression—in short, the value—of the 
image, likeness, or name of the celebrity used in the second 
work.124 A work that copies or allows the celebrity publicity 
value of the image, likeness, or name (the same meaning, same 
expression, same purpose, for the same audience) to shine 
through in the artist’s work will not be deemed to be fair.125 
Another, less-strictly-defined path to the same determination is 
to consider whether the second work’s predominant purpose is 
to exploit the celebrity publicity value of the name, image, or 
likeness, or whether it has a predominantly expressive purpose 
adding new, expressive value to the original name, image, or 
likeness.126 
A. TRANSFORMATION WITH A PREDOMINANT FIRST AMENDMENT 
EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE IN COPYRIGHT FAIR USE LAW 
I have written elsewhere about the convergence of 
transformation and predominant purpose analysis in copyright 
fair use law.127 Campbell established that “transformation” 
requires a change in the purpose and character of the work.128 
It is evident from the record of cases that the courts take the 
“purpose” part of that interpretive rule very seriously, for all of 
the approved fair uses in the appellate cases involved a change 
in the predominant purpose for the use of the work rather than 
simply a change in the character (the form, the contents) of the 
                                                          
478 (Cal. 2003); Matthew D. Bunker, Free Speech Meets the Publicity Tort: 
Transformative Use Analysis in Right of Publicity Law, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 
301, 304–20 (2008); Garon, supra note 41, at 485–92; Andrew Koo, Right of 
Publicity: The Right of Publicity Fair Use Doctrine—Adopting a Better 
Standard, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 18–23 (2007). 
 124. See, e.g., Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909–10; Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740 
F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (D.N.J. 2010); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. 
Supp. 2d 758, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (discussing the distinctiveness of products 
and potential confusion by consumers). 
 125. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909–10; Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800. 
 126. ETW, 332 F.3d at 959; Winter, 69 P.3d at 478; Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 
809; Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 127. What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 1–3. 
 128. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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work.129 
There are three successful pathways to fair use in 
copyright law: 
• Transformation of content of the work with a 
change in the predominant purpose of the work130 
• Transformation of the context of the work with a 
change in the predominant purpose of the work131 
• A significant change in the predominant purpose 
and function of the work even without a change in 
the content or context of the work.132 
The strongest transformative fair uses are those that 
modify the contents, function, and purpose of the original work 
in a significant and obvious manner, by turning the meaning of 
the work on its head, or by openly criticizing the original 
work.133 Ideally, the expression of the contents of the original 
work is altered134 or overwhelmed by the addition of significant 
creative expression135 so that the predominant purpose of the 
new work is significantly different from that of the original 
work.136 This is the most secure path to fair treatment of other 
artists’ works, which is why the recommendation of this Article 
                                                          
 129. What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 5; see also Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
Google’s use of thumbnails in search engines is highly transformative); Blanch 
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 248–50 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that transformative use 
requires more than finding a new way to exploit the original work); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 130. See generally What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 274–95. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. In this recent work, I examine all of the United States Supreme 
Court and United States Court of Appeals cases applying the transformative 
test to evaluate copyright fair use claims in every type of copyrightable media. 
In the instant article, I focus my discussion on the data set of cases 
synthesized in the prior article that involve artistic works and cases involving 
certain fair use defenses, such as parody, that are well-suited for application 
in art and design situations. 
 133. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stressing the importance of altering the 
purpose of images); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251–53; Mattel Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800–02 (9th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank, 268 
F.3d at 1269. 
 134. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1257, 1269; 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pics. Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 135. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251; Mattel, 353 F.3d at 800–02. 
 136. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251; Suntrust Bank, 268 
F.3d at 1269. 
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is that if artists or designers intend to incorporate material 
from preexisting works into their own works, they should 
modify the material in an obvious manner. 
The use of an artistic original work will be deemed 
transformative when the use adds valuable artistic changes to 
the original giving the resulting work new meaning and artistic 
expression.137 The artistic changes must create a new meaning 
and new expression; if the original simply is redisplayed, 
reproduced, rebroadcast, or redistributed in a new mode or 
method of exploiting the same creative artistic virtues of the 
original work, the use will be deemed not to be transformative, 
and not to be a fair use.138 This point is significant for artists 
                                                          
 137. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–80 (discussing how the rap group 
added new musical style and genre and new lyrics to original rock ballad 
creating a new musical composition with a new, cynical, streetwise meaning); 
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244 (examining how artist Jeffrey Koons placed Blanch’s 
original fashion magazine photographic image into painting combining image 
with additional “images of confections” and Niagra Falls to make a new 
expression commenting on the appetites of modern society); Leibovitz, 137 
F.3d at 109 (examining how a movie poster changed original Leibovitz 
photograph from a work of serious art with a historical Renaissance art 
reference to one with a new parodic meaning). 
 138. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 307 (3d Cir. 
2011) (concluding the slightly cropped photo of radio “shock jocks” used for the 
same news and promotional purposes as the original photo was not 
transformative, and therefore not fair use); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd., 619 
F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff Bouchat’s Shield Drawing was adapted 
for the Raven’s “Flying B” logo on helmets and uniforms, on the playing field, 
and in posters, tickets, and advertising, but all such uses as a logo still 
revealed and reproduced the same valuable artistic expression as the original 
Shield Drawing, and the product of the changes and adaptations still carried 
the same meaning and message as the original); Gaylord v. United States, 595 
F.3d 1364, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding the photograph and postage 
stamp depicting plaintiff’s Korean War Memorial each adapted and altered 
the appearance of the war memorial to display a different tone and mood in 
the depiction, but the ultimate meaning and message of the original memorial 
and these artistic adaptations was held to be the same: to remember and 
celebrate Korean War Veterans; thus, the uses were not fair); Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming that although defendant’s sampling placed the iconic Atomic Dog 
funk lyric and funk track in an updated hip-hop recording, the most 
recognizable elements of the funk track were reproduced with little variation 
or alteration from the original; thus, the track was reused for the same 
musical artistic purposes as the original, and the hip-hop version of the 
sample carried the same meaning and expression as the original; therefore, 
the use was not fair); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (changing the format and medium of entertainment 
material from the Seinfeld television series to a trivia quiz format did not add 
new and valuable artistic or entertainment content to the original material, 
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and designers because it often is the case that artists and 
designers will seek to incorporate preexisting works into their 
works precisely to show off the valuable aesthetic attributes of 
the preexisting work. Artists want to recast the works in a new 
setting, but allow the original art and imagery to shine through 
in their new work; musicians want to take an attractive piece of 
an earlier recording and loop it continuously to show off its 
attractive elements. The motivation to reproduce attractive 
works to benefit the quality and attractiveness of the artist’s 
own works is understandable, but the cases confirm that this 
kind of plagiaristic exploitation is unfair and unacceptable. 
Works that are not changed in form139 may be transformed 
in predominant purpose by recontextualization of the copied 
material.140 In successful cases, the new context contains 
additional expression that overwhelms the initial expression 
and prevents the original material from shining through in the 
new work for the same purposes for which the original work 
was created.141 A change in context for an artistic work even 
without any changes to the content of the work may be 
                                                          
and did not change the meaning, message, expression, or purpose of the 
original material; thus, the use of the original entertainment content was not 
fair). 
 139. I have evaluated changes in form to mean more than a change in size 
or reorientation of the material on a new axis. Certain cases involved a change 
in size of the works from full-scale to thumbnail size. See, e.g., Perfect 10, 508 
F.3d at 1164; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 
613 (2d Cir. 2006). Others took preexisting works and reoriented them on the 
axis of the work from diagonal to straight vertical. See e.g., Blanch, 467 F.3d 
at 247–49. Nothing in the law or cases indicates that this alteration alone is 
meaningful to a fair use analysis. However, as discussed previously, in each of 
these cases, the recontextualization of the material along with a change in the 
predominant purpose and functioning of the material was significant in 
making a successful determination of fair use in each case. 
 140. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 248 (stating that artist Jeffrey Koons changed 
the function and purpose of Blanch’s fashion photograph by recontextualizing 
it with a large array of images of “confections”); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802–03 
(explaining that the artist changed the function and purpose of a depiction of 
Barbie by recontextualizing the image into scenes with kitchen appliances). 
 141. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 248 (explaining that the plaintiff’s photography 
was only one part of the imagery of women’s legs shown, and whose expression 
was further changed by its juxtaposition with images of “confections” in Koons’ 
work); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802–03 (arguing that the artist changed the 
function and purpose of a depiction of Barbie by recontextualizing the image 
into scenes of seemingly dangerous kitchen appliances, thus changing the 
meaning and purpose from a depiction of the “ideal American woman” to an 
image of a frazzled or oblivious female in peril). 
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sufficient if the predominant purpose and functioning of the 
new work is sufficiently different from the original work and 
fulfills one of the principle goals of the copyright laws.142 A 
change in context alone for artistic works is not necessarily 
sufficient if the change does not have a new purpose and 
function that communicates a new meaning with new, valuable 
expression, furthering a goal of the copyright laws.143 
                                                          
 142. See Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 319–20 (explaining that the use of original 
Shield Drawing in logos held and displayed for historical and archival reasons 
at the Baltimore Ravens’ headquarters was a use with a purpose and function 
different from the artistic purpose and meaning of the original work, and 
therefore holding that historical, referential, and archival uses are appropriate 
fair use purposes); Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1146, 1165 (holding that although 
the original photographs were reduced in size to thumbnail images but 
otherwise reproduced verbatim, the purpose and function of the thumbnails 
within an internet search engine’s “image search” results screen was a 
completely new function with a new and different purpose and meaning from 
the artistic purposes and meaning of the original photographs; the use fulfilled 
proper fair use reference and research purposes); see also Bill Graham 
Archives, 448 F.3d at 609–10 (holding that while the original images of concert 
posters were reduced in size but otherwise reproduced verbatim, the purpose 
and function of the new use of the images—to document a timeline of concert 
performances of the Grateful Dead—was completely new and different from 
the artistic purposes and meaning of the original poster images and fulfilled 
proper fair use archival, historical, referential, and educational purposes); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the 
use of original images in reduced size for purposes of displaying search results 
in internet image search engine was a new function with a new purpose and 
meaning); Núnez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 
2000) (concluding that the republication of original modeling portfolio 
photographs without alteration but within new context of news reporting of 
the actual existence of the photographs themselves after subject became 
Puerto Rico’s Miss Universe contestant was a new function with a new 
meaning and new purpose for the photographs that met fair use news and 
reference purposes); Sony Computer Ent. America, Inc. v. Bleem, L.L.C., 214 
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (using screen shots from original computer game in 
comparative advertising to critique the original images was fair use). 
 143. Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 309 (concluding that aside from historical and 
archival uses at Baltimore Ravens’ headquarters, the general use of the 
plaintiff’s Shield Drawing in stadium advertising, on the field, on uniforms, on 
tickets and other merchandise did not represent a new appropriate function 
for the drawing and did not fulfill a different artistic or creative purpose for 
the original work, and thus, did not constitute a fair use); Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 
1372–73 (determining that the function and meaning of the original sculpture 
and the images in the photograph and postage stamp were held to be the 
same: to celebrate and remember Korean War Veterans); Leadsinger, Inc. v. 
BMG Music Publ’g,, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that change 
in form and function from audio recording to karaoke soundtrack audio 
recording was not a new function carrying new meaning or purpose from 
original musical recordings); see also Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama 
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Parody is an excellent fair use because it uses the original 
work in order to ridicule the original work; the second user 
turns the function and purpose of the original work on its head, 
and in fact employs the expression of the original material in 
an effort to undermine the purposes and objectives of the 
original work.144 Satirical uses (i.e., uses for comment and 
                                                          
Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the 
change from an audio recording to a karaoke soundtrack audio recording was 
not a new function carrying new meaning or purpose from original musical 
recordings); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628–
29 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that video and audio segments from performances 
of Elvis were recombined into a new context—a comprehensive video 
biography work—but were reproduced for the same purpose and carried the 
same function and meaning as the original video and audio recordings); Video 
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198–200 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (copying two-minute segments of original motion pictures for use as 
internal reference for proprietary video database did not create a new function 
carrying a new appropriate fair use meaning and purpose different from the 
original artistic works); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175–76 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (depicting the original artwork in a print ad was simply a new 
context for the work without any change in artistic purpose and function of the 
original work); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (facilitating a change in format from CD to MP3 format and 
changing context of recording to facilitate unlicensed uncompensated file 
transfer did not create a new function carrying a new appropriate fair use 
meaning and purpose different from the original artistic works); Infinity 
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding 
that the change in mode and medium of communication from radio broadcast 
to telephone communication did not create a new function carrying a new 
appropriate fair use meaning and purpose different from the original artistic 
works); Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(concluding reproduction of a story quilt image from an authorized museum 
poster to an unauthorized use as set dressing on television program did not 
create a new function carrying a new appropriate fair use meaning and 
purpose different from the original artistic work). 
 144. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–84 
(1994) (concluding that 2 Live Crew copied the bass riff and musical scheme of 
the beginning of “Pretty Woman” and proceeded to distort the music and lyrics 
to make a rap song that ridiculed the romantic tone and naïveté of the original 
rock ballad), Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272–74, 
1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing that “Wind Done Gone” copied characters 
and situations from “Gone With the Wind” but distorted the dialogue and 
point of view of the work by adding a new tone and new meaning to the “race 
relations of the place and era” of the original), Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802–03 
(discussing that the artist placed Barbie dolls in unusual settings with kitchen 
appliances to comment on and criticize Barbie’s iconic status as a role model 
for young American girls), and Leibovitz v. Paramount Pics. Corp., 137 F.3d 
109, 114–115 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing that Paramount created the poster 
with famous portrait of a pregnant star and distorted the image by 
superimposing a male comedian’s head onto the female star’s body as a 
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criticism where the object of the criticism is not the original 
work or the original author), may be accepted as fair use, but 
the new work must be highly transformed and must not exploit 
the same creative artistic virtues of the original for the same or 
similar purposes as the original.145 All of the changes in 
function and purpose by the authors of successful parodies and 
satires created a new work or a new situation of employment of 
the original work that furthered important First Amendment 
public policy goals of comment and criticism, education, or 
research (both as to current and historical events). The second 
users also produced a new work or new employment of the old 
work in a manner that had little competitive impact on the 
original work’s owners’ ability to continue to exploit the 
original functions and purposes of the original work,146 
                                                          
comment to the pretentious artistic styling of the original), with Salinger v. 
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Colting’s attempt to 
advance the plot of “Catcher in the Rye” by sixty years and addition of 
Salinger as a character in Salinger’s own story to comment on and critique the 
original work, the main character, and Salinger’s reclusive lifestyle, but in the 
end, finding the new work merely exploited the same creative aspects of the 
original novel in the manner of a derivative work, not a parody or other proper 
commentary or criticism), and Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 
109 F.3d 1394, 1400–05 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that although O.J. Simpson 
trial story changed the entire genre, theme, tone, characters, dialogue, and 
plot of the original “Cat in the Hat” work, the court found no critical 
commentary or statement of any kind regarding or reflecting on the original 
Dr. Seuss work, and the court concluded that the second work merely stole 
and exploited the Dr. Seuss work to grab attention). 
 145. Compare Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244, 248 (finding that Blanch’s work was 
used as one example of the genre of fashion imagery, and the additional 
creative, artistic material added by Koons and his recontextualization of the 
work overwhelmed any exploitive purpose in the use of the creative content 
reflected in Blanch’s original photograph), with Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73 
(explaining that the additional commentary and message added by Colting to 
the message of Catcher in the Rye did not change the fact that his work 
generally exploited the creative material of the original work by advancing the 
plot, rather than changing the function and purpose of the work), and Castle 
Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the Seinfeld Aptitude Test did not make commentary or 
criticism regarding the Seinfeld series, but still exploited the same creative 
value and meaning of the original for the same entertainment purpose as the 
original), and Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1400–01 (explaining that the 
author’s “Cat Not in the Hat” commentary and criticism of the O.J. Simpson 
trial and the U.S. court system did not justify the exploitation of the creative 
artwork and rhyming style of the original Dr. Seuss work). 
 146. In basic terms, a new work with a completely changed message and 
purpose is unlikely to satisfy the fans and consumers of the original work; 
thus, the new work does not “supersede the objects” of the original work. E.g., 
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supporting the argument that the second users’ uses were fair. 
The advice of this Article is not to use other’s works or to 
modify them obviously. In cases of non-transformation, neither 
the contents nor the function and purpose of the original work 
is changed, no greater First Amendment public policy purpose 
is furthered beyond that served by the creation and publication 
of the original work, and the original work is therefore 
exploited for exactly the same purposes for which it was 
originally created. It is easy to see that these cases of self-
serving exploitation are not held to be fair.147 
Secondary users of artistic works might find it difficult to 
reconcile the several fair use cases where secondary users 
appear to have greatly altered significant aspects of the 
original works, but their uses were not found to be fair. These 
                                                          
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244, 258 (finding that Koon’s recontextualized use of legs 
from Blanch’s photograph had no deleterious effect upon Blanch’s 
photograph’s market value); Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 116–17 (“[T]he Paramount 
photograph did not interfere with any potential market for [Leibovitz’s] 
photograph or for derivative works based upon it.”); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342, 348–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J., sitting as circuit justice) 
(stating that fair use works do not “supersede the objects” of the original work 
but that exact copying of original works is not allowed); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F. Cas. at 348). 
 147. See Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 307 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (holding no fair use when photos of radio personalities were only 
slightly cropped to remove original photographer’s copyright notice, and 
otherwise used without permission for the same news and promotional 
purposes as the original); Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 309 (holding no fair use when a 
non-altered drawing that formed the basis of the team’s logo was used in 
dozens of items associated with the team); Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 530 
(holding that the non-alteration of basic elements of music when adapted for 
karaoke lead to a finding of no fair use); see also Zomba Enterprises, 491 F.3d 
at 582–83 (holding that the non-alteration of basic elements of music when 
adapted for karaoke lead to a finding of no fair use); Elvis Presley Enters., 349 
F.3d at 628–29 (finding no fair use when the original video clips and 
recordings were not altered or modified in content when compiled for 
biographical video compilation); Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 198–200 (finding 
no fair use when the film contents were excerpted without other alteration for 
use in proprietary video database); A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1015 (holding 
that there is no fair use when the content and expression of the original audio 
recordings were not altered or modified when the works were changed in 
digital format and compiled to assist file-sharing); Infinity Broad. Co., 150 
F.3d at 108–09 (finding no fair use when the only change in the work was a 
change in mode and medium of communication from radio broadcast to 
telephone communication); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70 (finding that the 
appearance of a story quilt poster was not altered or modified, but that only 
the amount shown or the timing of each display varied in the non-fair use 
display of the work). 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
2013] DIOS MIO 129 
 
seemingly incongruous outcomes are addressed by explanatory 
synthesis when all of these cases are considered together to 
explain the common underpinning and public policy objectives 
pursued by the courts in these opinions: even significant 
alteration of the form, or genre, or theme, or tone, or even the 
overall meaning of the works will not be found to be fair uses if 
non-trivial portions of the creative, artistic, and expressive 
virtues of the original works shine through and are not 
replaced or overwhelmed by the expression in the second 
work.148 Aside from specific critical fair uses such as parody 
that rely on the exposition of certain key attributes of the 
original work in the second work, in other contexts, if the 
creative, artistic, and expressive virtues of the original works 
still are discernible in the second work, and still add value to 
the second work, the use of the original work will be deemed 
unfair.149 
                                                          
 148. Compare Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372–73 (holding that there is no fair 
use when the appearance of the Korean War Memorial was significantly 
altered in the photograph and postage stamp but still depicted the same 
artistic design and expression of the original sculpture; the artistic 
embellishments of the photograph and stamp did not change the meaning and 
function of the original work), Bridgeport Music v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 
F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that hip hop group’s sampling of the 
iconic Atomic Dog sound and lyric significantly altered the genre and context 
of the original, but allowed the iconic sound and expression of the original 
work to shine through,  with that being the primary purpose of the inclusion of 
the same in the second work, and this improperly exploited the creative, 
artistic virtues of the original work), Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142 (finding that 
the Seinfeld trivia book significantly altered the form and presentation of the 
original television show content, but the transformation did not change the 
entertainment function and purpose of the original work and allowed the 
creative, entertaining content and expression of the original material to shine 
through in the second work), and Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1400–07 
(holding that the original artwork, graphic design, and poetic style of the 
original Dr. Seuss work was allowed to shine through in the second work 
although the style, genre, tone, and function of the plot and story of the second 
work was completely different from the original), with Blanch, 467 F.3d at 245 
(finding the original work was used as raw material—a placeholder for a 
certain genre of fashion photographic depiction of women—and the artistic 
changes added by Koons were meant to completely change the meaning and 
message of the depiction for a new function and purpose), and Leibovitz, 137 
F.3d at 109, 110-11 (finding the original photograph was altered specifically to 
change the meaning, function, and purpose of the original from a serious 
artistic portrait to a parody of the original work). 
 149. E.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73; Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372–73; 
Bridgeport Music, 585 F.3d at 278; Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142; Dr. Seuss 
Enters., 109 F.3d at 1407. 
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B. TRANSFORMATION WITH A PREDOMINANT FIRST AMENDMENT 
EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FAIR USE LAW 
The good news for those who seek to follow the ethical, fair 
use path with regard to celebrity images and likenesses is that 
DIOS MIO governs the path equally well with regard to 
publicity rights as it does with copyright: do not use celebrities’ 
names, images, and likenesses in your art and design works, or 
modify the images and likenesses in an obvious manner. Highly 
transformative uses that overwhelm the original celebrity 
image with new content and expression will be considered 
fair.150 Of these uses, parodies again appear to have the most 
potential for success because the second user is replicating the 
name, image, or likeness of the celebrity specifically for the 
purpose of making fun of the celebrity, fulfilling a valid First 
Amendment purpose of comment and criticism that requires 
the use of identifying information and imagery in order to 
reveal the subject of the criticism.151 Cases confirm that the use 
of names and images specifically to ridicule the celebrities is a 
fairly safe way to incorporate these names or images into 
                                                          
 150. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477–80 (Cal. 2003) (finding 
that DC Comics featured a highly transformed image of the Winter Brothers 
singing duo—the two were depicted as giant albino worms rather than human 
singing celebrities in a general effort to denigrate the two singers); World 
Wrestling Fed. Enter. Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417–
424, 428 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing how Big Dog T-shirt manufacturer used 
“dogified”—canine-morphed—images of pro-wrestlers such that the wrestlers 
were depicted as dogs with dog-like names and attributes, e.g., World 
Wrestling star, Stone Cold Steve Austin, was referred to as “Bone Cold Steve 
Pawstin” in Big Dog’s works, in as a parody of the pro-wrestlers); Cardtoons, 
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962–73 (10th Cir. 
1996) (discussing how the Cardtoons makers criticized baseball players’ egos, 
exorbitant salaries, and other excesses of their personalities through the 
device of artistic, but highly critical baseball cards that showed a transformed 
cartoon version of the ball player along with fake “stats” about the excesses or 
ego of the player). 
 151. See Winter, 69 P.3d at 477–80 (concluding the Winter Brothers were 
depicted in order to reveal the comic artist’s dislike of the singing duo; the 
artist did not recreate their image for any exploitative purpose other than to 
reveal the target of the criticism); World Wrestling, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 428 
(concluding that the Big Dog T-shirt manufacturer attempted to identify the 
targets of their spoofing with morphed images and names to suggest the 
“dogified” nature of the parody); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 962–63, 968–72 
(discussing how the Cardtoons makers rendered the images of players in 
cartoon form, and morphed their names to reveal the targets of the criticism, 
e.g., Barry Bonds was renamed “Treasury Bonds” as part of the criticism that 
he was overpaid and overly egotistical). 
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artworks and designs. 
Non-critical, non-parodic artistic expression of a celebrity 
image or likeness is a dangerous undertaking. A few courts 
interpreting New York law have gone on record as taking an 
expansive view toward allowing the depiction of a celebrity in 
works of art simply to display the celebrity in art.152 California 
courts have made the opposite record: a simple, artistic 
depiction of a celebrity for commercial sale of the artwork 
constitutes exploitation that violates the celebrity’s publicity 
rights.153 
Significant artistic transformation of the celebrity image 
improves the equation in favor of fair use.154 The fame of the 
artist and her notoriety for this kind of artistic transformation 
also will improve the odds that the fair use equation will work 
out in favor of the artist.155 In Comedy III, the court evaluated 
                                                          
 152. See Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993) 
(explaining a ruling that artists may create a limited number of art works 
depicting a celebrity image without liability under New York’s publicity law); 
see also Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(holding that defendant artist Barbara Kruger’s use of a photographic image of 
a female model from the 1960’s should be upheld against the model’s right of 
publicity claim; following Simeonov, the court’s holding was that Kruger’s 
depiction involved significant artistic recontextualization and added new 
expression to the original image, making Kruger’s use fair). 
 153. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–11 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding card company violated Paris Hilton’s right of publicity when it 
created a cartoon of the celebrity repeating her famous “That’s hot” line for a 
greeting card); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
806–09, 811 (Cal. 2001) (finding the artist violated the Three Stooges’ rights of 
publicity when the artist created a realistic depiction of the Stooges in 
charcoal art reproduced for sale on lithographs and T-shirts). 
 154. Compare Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 342, 349–54 (holding that the 
artist’s recontextualization contains “sufficiently transformative elements,” 
which consisted of cropping and enlarging the photograph as well as 
superimposing large red blocks that contained textual message), Winter, 69 
P.3d at 478 (holding that transforming singers into albino worms was highly 
transformative), and Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 609, 616 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (transforming an image of former disco star, Kirby—Lady 
Miss Kier—into an animated avatar, and transforming a refrain from one of 
the star’s songs, “Ooh la la,” into the name of the avatar, “Ulala” is fair use), 
with Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (arguing that a defendant’s artistic rendering 
in charcoal did not sufficiently transform the conventional image of the Three 
Stooges to succeed against Stooges’ publicity claim). 
 155. See Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 342, 349–50 (stating that the artist-
defendant, Barbara Kruger, is a “well-known artist, specializing in collage 
works combining photographs and text”; her cropping and enlargement of the 
1960’s photograph as well as superimposing large red blocks that contained 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
132 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
the fame, artistic reputation, eye-catching technique, and star-
power of Andy Warhol, holding that the artist overwhelmed the 
value of the celebrities’ images that shown through in the 
artist’s works.156 Gary Saderup, the artist-defendant in Comedy 
III, might have had a following for his realistic depictions of 
celebrities, but they were not presented in the context of some 
greater ironic statement or commentary about the meaning or 
message of the “stars” of his works. Saderup’s works were 
simple, faithful, realistic, artistic depictions of the celebrities, 
and as such, were held to violate the publicity rights of the 
celebrities.157 
The lesson for lawful, ethical treatment of celebrities’ 
names, images, and likenesses is that depiction of a celebrity to 
communicate the meaning or message or the actual attributes 
of the celebrity herself, absent any commentary on or criticism 
of the meaning and message or symbolism of the celebrity or 
her actions, is very likely to be found to be an unethical and 
unlawful exploitation of the celebrity’s publicity rights. If you 
modify the celebrity image’s appearance with a highly stylized, 
recognizable method or technique that is original to you and 
readily attributable to you (i.e., Modify It Obviously), then you 
greatly improve your chances of success in a right of publicity 
claim. You may not have to be as famous as Warhol or even 
Barbara Kruger, but the degree to which observers will say, 
“That is a great picture by [your name],” rather than, “That is a 
great picture of [celebrity’s name],” is a measure of the 
potential success you should expect if you choose to depict 
celebrity images in your art. 
Commentary and criticism and artistic transformation are 
not the only First Amendment expressive purposes that might 
be served by the use of a celebrity name, image, or likeness. 
There is a general exception to liability for the reporting of 
genuine newsworthy information about matters of public 
                                                          
textual message was held to be a fair use because of its artistic transformation 
and new expression added to the image); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (stating 
that Andy Warhol is a model for an artist whose works were valuable because 
they were obviously his own through “distortion and careful manipulation of 
context,” and not because they depicted Elvis, Marilyn Monroe, or Elizabeth 
Taylor). 
 156. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811. 
 157. See id. 
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interest.158 This has been extended to the depiction of 
celebrities and celebrity sports figures in the context of 
providing news and public affairs information about the sports 
they play,159 and commentary about the meaning and 
importance of the athlete’s achievements.160 The public interest 
and public affairs exception even has been extended to protect 
dissemination of information regarding current fashion trends 
in apparel.161 
It should be noted that news informational uses must be 
genuine; one cannot simply celebrate the celebrity of the 
moment by recreating their image and likeness in a work and 
claiming that the use is intended for spreading news and public 
interest information about the celebrity.162 Persons enjoying 
                                                          
 158. Clay Calvert, Every Picture Tells a Story, Don’t It? Wrestling With the 
Complex Relationship Among Photographs, Words and Newsworthiness in 
Journalistic Storytelling, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 353–58 (2010); Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 53–59 (1998); see also DUBOFF, MURRAY & 
KING, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 77, at Bk. S. 
 159. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
use of major league baseball players’ names, stats, and likenesses in fantasy 
baseball game is protected by the newsworthiness and public affairs 
exception); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that an artistic depiction of Tiger Woods during his first victory at the 
Masters was fair use); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 
(D.N.J. 2010) (holding that use of collegiate football player’s avatar in football 
simulation video game was not a violation of publicity rights). 
 160. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 931, 936 (finding that the artist’s depiction of 
Tiger Woods’ during Woods’ historic win at the Masters was permitted in part 
because of public interest in newsworthy athletes and sporting events). 
 161. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that the movie star’s image shown in photograph while 
playing a famous movie role was allowed to be modified for use in an article 
presenting “a combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and 
verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous actors” that fell under 
the public affairs exception). 
 162. Compare Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 910–11 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that Hallmark Cards could not depict the socialite and 
sometime reality TV star, Paris Hilton, in a greeting card cartoon that played 
off of Hilton’s reality TV role as a waitress and her general notoriety; the use 
was found to be unfair), and Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452–58 
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that OutKast hip hop group’s use of Rosa Park’s name, 
although intended to be “‘metaphorical’ or ‘symbolic,’” was not about Rosa 
Parks in biographical sense, and it  “unquestionably enhanced the song’s 
potential sale to the consuming public,” which raised the genuine issue of 
material fact whether this use was unfair), with ETW, 332 F.3d at 931, 936 
(holding that the “Wood’s victory in the 1997 tournament was a historic event 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
134 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
the news and information services exception do not necessarily 
have to be full-time members of the press,163 but they must be 
involved in a concerted effort to disseminate news and 
information, not simply producing a one-off depiction of a 
celebrity in an artwork or design. 
Celebrities lead newsworthy lives—it is a coincidence of 
factors relating to a person’s public interest and news potential 
that leads to the person being identified as a celebrity—but not 
every use of a name, image, or likeness of a celebrity can be 
justified as news or public interest in public affairs expressive 
activity. Advertising and promotional uses of celebrities’ 
names, images, or likenesses in the sale of goods or other 
commercial activities are the classic instances of violations of 
the celebrities’ rights of publicity, even if the particular image 
or footage used has or had, at least at some point, news and 
public interest value.164 
                                                          
in the world of sports” and that “[a] piece of art that portrays a historic 
sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture attaches to 
such events”  was found to be fair). 
 163. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 918–19 (noting the artist was a sports artist, not 
a newsperson, and did not publish his painting and serigraphs in any news 
outlet). 
 164. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909–11 (determining the socialite and 
sometime reality TV star, Paris Hilton, became the subject of a Hallmark 
greeting card that featured an artistic, cartoon rendition of Hilton playing off 
of Hilton’s tag line, “That’s hot,” and her reality TV role as a waitress); 
Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’gGrp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding 
Hustler Magazine was not permitted to feature twenty-year-old nude and 
partially nude photographs of one-time wrestler, Nancy Benoit, in a 2008 issue 
of the magazine following Benoit’s murder in 2007; neither the 
newsworthiness of the murder, nor the past-fame or notoriety of Benoit 
provided a justification for exploitation of twenty-year-old images of Benoit for 
purposes of promoting the current, 2008 sales of the magazine); Bosley v. 
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925–29 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (concluding adult 
video makers were not permitted to display wet t-shirt images of news 
anchorwoman in the context of promoting the sale of adult video products); 
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir.1996) 
(remanding the case to trial based on sufficient facts shown by Abdul-Jabbar 
that General Motors’s advertisement for Oldsmobile automobiles during the 
NCAA basketball tournament with footage of Abdul-Jabbar playing college 
basketball was exploitative and not a fair use; the newsworthiness of Abdul-
Jabbar’s basketball record did not succeed in overcoming the fact that the 
images were predominantly used to draw attention to General Motors’ attempt 
to sell automobiles); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 
1988) (remanding the case to trial based on sufficient showing that Ford Motor 
Company’s  ad mimicking the singing voice of Bette Midler in order to 
advertise and sell Ford automobiles may not be a fair use). 
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In Zacchini, the only right of publicity case adjudicated by 
the United States Supreme Court, the high court held that the 
unauthorized broadcast of the entire fifteen second 
performance of a “human cannonball” act (Mr. Zacchini being 
the aforementioned cannonball) at a county fair, aired in the 
context of a regular nightly news broadcast in a segment 
devoted to local human interest stories, still violated Zacchini’s 
right of publicity because it was unfair and exploitative to air 
for free the entire act of a performer who earns his livelihood 
from these fifteen second performances.165 The First 
Amendment rights of a member of the press timely engaged in 
reporting a bona fide news story were overcome by the rights of 
the celebrity not to have his livelihood threatened by this 
usurpation of his publicity rights. This case should send a clear 
message to artists and designers to play fairly with celebrity 
images and likenesses, because fair and ethical handling of 
publicity rights is a significant concern of the courts that will, 
in proper circumstances, outweigh even a powerful First 
Amendment expressive justification for the use of the celebrity 
name, image, or likeness. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The good news for the ethical artist and designer is that 
the same activities of creation that support copyrightability of 
the artist’s or designer’s own work will also support the 
fairness of use of others’ works or their images or likenesses. If 
the artist’s or designer’s motive is to be creative—to create new 
content, meaning, and expression—and not exploitative—to rip 
off another to avoid the drudgery of being creative—then the 
artist’s or designer’s works will be copyrightable and uses of 
others’ works and their names, images, and likenesses will be 
fair and ethical. Exploitation of famous celebrity images follows 
the same path: depiction of a celebrity to communicate the 
meaning or message or the actual attributes of the celebrity 
herself, absent any commentary on or criticism of the meaning 
and message or symbolism of the celebrity or her actions, is 
very likely to be found to be an unethical and unlawful 
exploitation of the celebrity’s publicity rights. If an artist 
depicts a celebrity for the purpose of criticizing the celebrity, 
                                                          
 165. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–78 
(1977). 
MURRAY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2013  10:54 AM 
136 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
her use is likely to be found to be fair. Alternatively, if the 
artist modifies the celebrity image’s appearance with a highly 
stylized, recognizable method or technique that is original and 
readily attributable to the artist (i.e., Modify It Obviously), 
then the artist has greatly improved her chances of success in a 
right of publicity claim. 
The DIOS MIO recommendation reminds artists and 
designers that plagiaristic motives are recognized in the arts as 
well as in literary and academic endeavors. Crass exploitation 
of valuable works or celebrity images so that the expressive 
value of these works or images might be credited to the artist 
as new, creative expression conceived of and executed by the 
artist will be regarded as an act of unfair and unethical 
exploitation. The label—copycat, derivative, infringer, pirate, or 
plagiarist—is not as important as the motivation that is 
coupled with the action. The gray and black areas of potentially 
unethical behavior are avoided if you “Don’t Include Other’s 
Stuff, or Modify It Obviously.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
